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Abstract
This paper provides a framework for the securities transaction industry in
the EU to understand the functions performed, the institutions involved and
the parameters concerned that shape market and ownership structure. Of
particular interest are microeconomic incentives of the industry players that
can be in contradiction to social welfare. We evaluate the three functions and
the strategic parameters - the boundary decision, the communication standard
employed and the governance implemented - along the lines of three e±ciency
concepts. By structuring the main factors that in°uence these concepts and
by describing the underlying trade-o®s among them, we provide insight into
a highly complex industry. Applying our framework, the paper describes
and analyzes three consistent systems for the securities transaction industry.
We point out that one of the systems, denoted as 'contestable monopolies',
demonstrates a superior overall e±ciency while it might be the most sensitive
in terms of con¯guration accuracy and thus di±cult to achieve and sustain.
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The developments within the securities transaction industry in the EU have be-
come a subject of academic awareness. Of particular interest are the consequences
on market structure and ¯rm strategy with the increasing volume in cross-border
transactions which is mainly accountable to the shift from a domestic towards a
more international approach in the investors' investment activity.
While the current trading, clearing and settlement structure in the EU is highly
cost-e±cient for domestic securities transactions this does not hold for cross-border
activities.1 Although exact ¯gures are di±cult to obtain, former research as well as
the pricing tables of international central securities depositories (ICSDs) indicate
clearing and settlement costs for these trades being several times higher than for
domestic transactions.
We suppose that this is mainly due to the underlying economies in the indus-
try, namely strong network externalities and economies of scale and scope. These
e®ects are more or less fully exploited and observable on the domestic trading level
by utilizing a monopolistic, regulated structure for securities transactions. In many
European countries one major trading and one major clearing and settlement insti-
tution service the lion's share of domestic transactions. In some countries, such as
Germany, the whole transaction process, i.e. trading, clearing and settlement is even
vertically integrated into one entity, thereby enabling straight-through processing
possibilities.
If the perspective is on the European level, we observe several of these institu-
tions.2 Thus, the typical cross-border trade requires substantial interaction among
the pertaining di®erent trading, clearing and settlement systems which can only be
e®ectively dealt with by a large number of intermediaries acting as (sub)custodians
in the settlement process. This extends the length of the value chain and thereby
increases the costs for the investors. More interaction requirement is also more
risky due to the higher complexity of the trade and a higher likelihood of failures.
Higher risks usually mean additional collateral requirements which is a further cost
driver. In summary, securities transaction costs can be signi¯cantly higher in the
cross-border context.3
As EU o±cials and big institutional clients express their desire for a fully in-
tegrated European ¯nancial market in order to reach full mobility of capital, most
experts believe that the underlying economies of the market will lead to some form
of consolidation in the years to come. Nevertheless, only relative slow progress is
made in this respect which is blamed on several barriers in the ¯elds of diverging
technical requirements, market practices, taxation practices and legal issues.4
Our analysis of the industry focuses on purely economic issues and largely ignores
the non-economic barriers for an e±cient solution.5 We present a framework that
captures the major factors in°uencing the securities transaction industry and derive
possible sensible industry settings out of it.
One of the ¯rst academic contributions in this area is by Giddy, Saunders, and
Walter (1996): They analyze four alternative models for the European clearing
1Confer Lannoo and Levin (2001, p. 26).
2Despite recent consolidation e®orts by Euronext, which was originally formed by the merger of
three European exchanges, and Euroclear, the major CSD for this exchange, there are still several
providers for trading, clearing and settlement existent in Europe.
3Lannoo and Levin (2001, p. 14 - 30) and Deutsche BÄ orse Group and Clearstream International
(2002, p. 15 - 29) present a cost analysis of cross-border transactions.
4The Giovannini Group (2001) identi¯es ¯fteen barriers to an integrated market, that are
examined further in their follow-up report, Giovannini Group (2003).
5However, we are aware that a ¯rst-best solution (as it might be possible when building the
industry from scratch) is hardly feasible in reality due to the existing history and the associated
restructuring costs which in some cases would be higher than the expected future bene¯ts from
restructuring.
1and settlement market mainly from the perspective of the users of these services.
Di®erences between their models exist in the way that linkages between the CSDs
are structured. Our approach is similar to theirs in respect to evaluating trading,
clearing and settlement along three dimensions and deriving distinct systems for a
future industry setting. Unlike their approach, we take microeconomic incentives
of the key industry players in more detail into account and base the analysis of
possible systems on sounder foundations regarding these aspects.
The framework and structure of this paper In the ¯rst part of this paper,
we develop a framework to analyze the advantages and disadvantages of certain
industry outcomes. We evaluate the e±ciency of the securities transaction system
along three dimensions - static, dynamic and systemic e±ciency - discussed in detail
in section 2.
As the ¯rst class of components in our framework, we identify three activities
along the value chain, namely trading, clearing and settlement (TCS). After giving a
brief description, we explain the underlying economies of the activities at each level
of the value chain and the interdependencies across the whole chain in section 3.
The activities are performed and used by three di®erent classes of institutions in
the industry - the providers of the infrastructure, the users and the regulators - and
will be set forth in section 4. Readers familiar with the activities and institutions
in the securities transaction industry might want to skip these sections.
In section 5, we regard possible strategies and associated actions to highlight
the microeconomic incentives of the institutions. Three di®erent decisions have
to be made - where to set the boundaries, whether to adopt an industry-wide
standard and how to assign ownership rights in these governance structures. We
focus on the action set of the infrastructure providers only, i.e. one class of the
institutions, due to conciseness reasons. However, the interdependencies between
the three institutions that result in certain decision patterns and the decisions'
impact on the users and regulators are highlighted where necessary. Figure 1 gives
an overview of our framework.
Using our framework, we show in the second part possible consistent TCS-
systems in section 6 that are e±cient from the viewpoint of social welfare. Its
individual components are complementary and thus reinforcing each other. Poten-
tial drawbacks and implications for social welfare are discussed. We conclude that
the particular system, denoted as contestable monopolies, shows superior results
when analyzed with our e±ciency concepts. However, this system might be more
di±cult to achieve given the starting situation in the European Union, while also
being more fragile and di±cult to sustain. Section 7 describes a possible transition
path to an appropriate system for the pan-European securities transaction industry
and concludes.
2 Three concepts for evaluation
While in many (academic) discussions the term e±ciency is merely set equal to
cost e±ciency or cost e®ectiveness, we would like to stress also other important
parameters in the context of our paper that are important for (1) evaluating the
generated economic rents and (2) measuring the resulting e±ciency. Economic rents
are created through 'good' investment decisions by the various constituencies and
allocated to these institutions through 'good' distribution rules. This interplay
between ex ante incentives and ex post distribution determines the e±ciency of
possible TCS-systems. We analyze e±ciency along three lines: static e±ciency,
dynamic e±ciency and systemic e±ciency. We shortly describe each concept and
potential trade-o®s between them.
2Figure 1: TCS-Framework
2.1 Static e±ciency
A certain activity is performed in a statically e±cient way if there is no solution
that would allow a less costly implementation. It is under this notion that the
commonly used concept of cost e±ciency is considered. Parameters in°uencing
the static e±ciency are the costs of production which in turn are in°uenced by
the underlying technologies and the economies arising from these. In the securities
transaction industry, network externalities6 are prevalent. They lead in many areas,
like the trading of a single derivative instrument or the settlement of a particular
stock, to an e±cient market structure that is a natural monopoly.
Static e±ciency thus increases if the number of companies conducting busi-
ness along the securities transaction value chain decreases due to the underlying
economies. However, the resulting loss in competition and the costs of regulation
that has to be set up to keep the remaining companies and their rent-extracting
potential in check might lead to a lowering of static e±ciency.
2.2 Dynamic e±ciency
Activities are performed in a dynamically e±cient way if today's structures and
investments do not hamper the performance of these activities in the future. By in-
vesting in a certain technology or by institutionalizing a certain industry structure,
the ability to change and to adapt becomes a®ected. Particularly the dominance
of the market by a network provider or the sponsor of a network - as Economides
calls it - may have detrimental e®ects on the innovativeness of the market.7 In-
dustry structures and processes that do not allow for innovation and for quality
improvement in future thus are not e±cient under our notion of dynamic e±ciency.
6For a detailed discussion on network externalities confer Shapiro and Varian (1999, p. 173 -
225).
7See Economides (1993, p. 92).
3Competition in the market usually helps to alleviate problems such as low innova-
tiveness, poor quality of the goods and services whereas the absence of competition
may lead to complacency and to less innovation as it is common in a monopolistic
environment. For measuring dynamic e±ciency key parameters are (1) the industry
structure that determines the di±culty of entering the TCS-industry, (2) the rate
of technological innovation - which is to a certain degree exogenous to the securities
transaction industry - and (3) the propensity of all institutions to invest and the
resulting sum of all investments.
2.3 Systemic e±ciency
Our third evaluation concept, which we denote systemic e±ciency, should provide
insight on systemic risk issues that are inherent on various stages of the value
chain. Our goal is to take into account the stability of the TCS-industry to adverse
systemic events. We de¯ne systemic e±ciency as the degree of robustness of the
activities in the securities transaction industry to systemic risks that are borne from
strong adverse systemic events.8 A systemic event occurs when a 'bad event' for
one or more market participant(s) has subsequently negative repercussions on other
market participants. Such an event may vary in severity, ranging from a delay in
payment or delivery of the securities in question to a full-blown failure of a party
to meet the agreed-upon obligations. Potential contagion e®ects have to be taken
seriously most notably in cases of strong negative systemic events like a failure of an
institution. Systemic risk issues are treated with great care by public and private
entities. Both ex ante (crisis prevention) and ex post (crisis management) measures
have to be introduced in order to deal with systemic risks. 'Good' regulation has
to ensure this.
2.4 Interdependencies
Note that the three concepts of e±ciency are interdependent: (1) The static ef-
¯cient solution of a monopoly conveys only minor incentives to innovate whereas
a few players in an oligopoly can interact in heavy competition and try to de-
velop better products and processes thereby increasing dynamic e±ciency. They
also compete for monopoly rents, that are non-existent in a perfect-competition-
environment where the users of the infrastructure reap the main part of economic
rents. The potential pro¯t that can be gained is therefore a big enough carrot to
undertake the large technological investments needed up-front. (2) Static e±ciency
can decline when measures are taken to increase systemic e±ciency: The provision
of collateral e.g. increases the stability of the industry against adverse shocks but
levies opportunity costs on the market participants. The existence of economic rents
also facilitates the build-up of a ¯nancial bu®er that allows these companies to be
more stable in times of systemic crises. (3) Perfect competition would contribute
potentially more in terms of innovativeness thereby increasing dynamic e±ciency
but the systemic e±ciency could be damaged since a more fragmented structure
may impose more work on regulators to keep the overall system sound.
8The terminology used in this paragraph is adapted from de Bandt and Hartmann (2000)
albeit the authors discuss this issue in much greater depth. See de Bandt and Hartmann (2000,
p. 10 - 17) for further details.
43 Three classes of activities - The securities trans-
action value chain
For the purposes of analyzing the ¯nancial services and the e±ciency with which
these are employed we de¯ne the securities transaction value chain. This value chain
has three main activities. Securities need to be traded, the results of the trade have
to be con¯rmed by a clearing process and the delivery of money and paper to the
parties to a trade has to be settled.9 In the following we characterize each class of
activity and analyze them from the aforementioned e±ciency-concepts perspective.
We will consider three di®erent security classes (stocks, bonds and derivatives) and
make explicit distinctions when necessary.
3.1 Trading
The process of trading can be characterized as a contractual agreement between
a buyer and an accordant seller to exchange a certain amount of securities for a
certain amount of money at a certain point in time. We identify intermediation and
liquidity costs as the relevant trading costs for the investors.
Intermediation costs exist as a regular investor does not have direct access to a
securities trading system. She rather channels her orders via an intermediary such
as a broker or a bank who is member of the trading system. Intermediation costs
include most notably brokerage fees and exchange-related fees.
Liquidity costs describe costs that are a function of liquidity. Liquidity can
be characterized along four dimensions, namely width, depth, immediacy and re-
silience.10 The general rule is that these costs decrease when a security becomes
more liquid.11
When focusing on the group of institutional investors, being a large contributor
to total securities transaction activity, intermediation costs appear to be of minor
importance as they represent a relatively small fraction of transaction costs whereas
liquidity costs account for a large chunk of the total transaction costs.12 Therefore,
liquidity plays a pivotal role for the choice of the trading location.
Further relevant aspects of trading that are beyond the scope of this paper in-
clude but are not limited to issues such as centralized versus decentralized trading13,
continuous trading versus call markets14, °oor-based versus automated trading15
and the internalization16 of trades.
9Custody functions follow the settlement process. These ensue the distribution of coupon
payments, the implementation of corporate actions and the lending of securities besides the trading-
induced transfer of ownership. We will subsume these transaction-induced custody aspects under
the settlement activity and ignore the other services in custody. Taking into account all aspects of
custody would add to the complexity of our framework, while providing only limited value-added
for our purposes.
10See Harris (1991, p. 3).
11Liquidity costs can be observed as spread costs and market impact costs. Spread costs are
generally measured as the di®erence between the bid and ask price of a security while market
impact costs relate to an adverse price movement when a large transaction a®ects the price of a
security.
12See Deutsche BÄ orse Group and Clearstream International (2002, p. 17 - 22) for a detailed
transaction cost analysis of retail and institutional investors.
13See Thygerson (1993, p. 142) and Fabozzi, Modigliani, and Ferri (1994, p. 6 - 7).
14Fabozzi, Modigliani, and Ferri (1994, p. 309 - 310).
15See Domowitz and Steil (1999).
16Schwarz-Schilling and Wahrenburg (2003, p. 8) describe this issue in more detail. For an
economic analysis of order internalization see also Theissen (2002).
53.2 Clearing
The clearing process can generally be described as the establishment of obligations
that result from a trade for the respective buyer and seller of a security. In speci¯c,
the process determines the number of securities that have to be delivered by the
latter and speci¯es the amount to be paid by the former at a certain point in time.
Clearing is a prerequisite for the settlement of a trade. While the determination
of obligations to each party after the trading process occurs only once for stocks
and bonds, this is di®erent for most derivatives instruments. Derivatives contracts
usually possess an additional time dimension, i.e. the actual execution of the agreed-
upon transaction lies in the future. Consequently, the obligation of the parties may
change over time since the contract's underlying asset may change in value. Thus,
the clearing process for derivatives resembles a continuous calculation of obligations
between the two trading parties.
Clearing can be done either on a bilateral or on a multilateral basis. Bilateral
clearing means the establishment of respective claims and obligations between two
trading partners. Multilateral clearing incorporates more than two market partici-
pants and determines the respective credits and debits of each party to other parties.
An important variation of multilateral clearing is the use of a central counterparty
(CCP) who steps between the trading partners and becomes the counterparty to
every transaction thereby lowering the exposure to risk.
Clearing can be performed on a gross or on a net basis. The former stands
for a - usually continuous - compilation of individual obligations for each market
participant on a trade-by-trade basis. Using the latter method means the establish-
ment of usually one daily net delivery and payment obligation for each participant
after having cancelled out payment and delivery obligation streams to other market
participants.17 Since this means a single net claim or obligation amount for each
participant, the netting process results in reduced credit risk exposure and lower
capital provision requirements and thus lower opportunity costs in comparison to
gross clearing.
3.3 Settlement
Settlement follows the clearing process in the securities transaction value chain
and represents the ¯nalization of the trade between the two involved parties. In
comparison to pure cash settlement systems between ¯nancial institutions, where
money is the only settlement 'currency', the settlement of securities adds a second
stream between the trading parties, namely the delivery of the securities. Generally,
the buyer of a security has to provide the funds while the seller has to deliver the
securities according to the agreed-upon conditions. During the settlement process,
cash and securities instructions of the respective trading party are approved for
settlement. After the approval, the actual settlement usually occurs via a book-
entry system in which funds and securities are reposted according to the transaction.
On this interface, settlement is closely related with custody aspects.
There are di®erent approaches with regard to the sequence of settlement, i.e. when
the actual payment of funds and delivery of securities occurs. We want to mention
two settlement methods here: The delivery-free-of-payment (DFP)-method means
a sequential delivery of securities and funds where the former is delivered ¯rst. In
contrast to this method the delivery-versus-payment (DVP)-approach delivers se-
curities and funds simultaneously. It is a "mechanism which ensures that the ¯nal
transfer of one asset occurs if and only if the ¯nal transfer of the other asset has
occurred"18 and is generally regarded as the safer method. As in clearing, securities
17See Giovannini Group (2001, p. 5).
18European Monetary Institute (1997, p. 42).
6settlement can be executed on a gross or net basis and show di®erences in both costs
and risk exposure.19
3.4 E±ciency analysis
3.4.1 Trading
Static e±ciency When analyzing the static e±ciency of trading, the focus is
on the underlying economies both from the user's and the provider's side. Strong
network externalities for the trading in one type of security and economies of scope
for di®erent types of securities are present for users while strong economies of scale
and economies of scope exist for the providers of trading services.
Economies of scale and network e®ects in one security Large volume
(institutional) investors, that want to execute a securities transaction, have a strong
preference for low liquidity costs over low intermediation costs. Investors seek a trad-
ing place with the highest possible liquidity in a certain security. As a new investor
allocates his trading volume to the location with the highest liquidity he provides
additional liquidity to all other investors that are trading there. Thus liquidity
creates positive network externalities for the investors and is self-reinforcing.
Network e®ects are also a major incentive for another group of users, namely
the issuers, because a network of investors can absorb the issuers' need for fresh
capital more easily the larger this network is. Again, this e®ect is self-reinforcing
as the larger the investor base the more capital raising ¯rms will be attracted.
On the service provider's side, economies of scale are exploitable since the setup
costs for a trading platform have a large portion of ¯xed costs. Thus, an increase in
trading volume requires only relatively low incremental costs once a trading platform
is established. This view is empirically con¯rmed by MalkamÄ aki's investigation on
the processing of trades at stock exchanges.20 As a result, the exchange reaching
high volumes of trading will be able to o®er lower transaction costs to users than
low-volume competitors. For °oor-based trading systems this e®ect is probably
not as pronounced as for automated trading systems since the ratio of ¯x costs to
variable costs is higher for the computerized system.
Taken the mutually reinforcing e®ects on both the user's and provider's side
together, the market for a single security resembles a 'winner takes it all' market
and has natural monopoly tendencies once a provider has reached a critical mass of
volume and liquidity. Thus, a concentration of trading activities in one security at
one provider pledges high static e±ciency.
Economies of scope when o®ering more than one security Taking the
exchange's point of view, economies of scope are realizable when trading in more
than merely one type of security is o®ered as this can be realized with low incre-
mental costs due to the already existing network of buyers and sellers.
For the users on the other hand, it is also economically bene¯cial to bundle their
trading activities on only few market places as this saves them access and back o±ce
costs to di®erent trading infrastructures.
We thus have mutually reinforcing economies of scope e®ects on both sides that
favor the existence of very few trading platforms for di®erent types of securities in
order to reach a high level of static e±ciency.
19See Kahn, McAndrews, and Roberds (2003) for an analysis of gross and net settlement from
a moral hazard perspective.
20However, he con¯nes his ¯ndings for very large stock exchanges. See MalkamÄ aki (1999) for
further details.
7Dynamic e±ciency Static e±ciency favors a rather monopolistic structure which
in turn hurts dynamic e±ciency as the latter falls with the decreasing levels of
competition. High network externalities in the trading of a security function as a
barrier to entry and o®er established trading platforms some protection from com-
petitors.21 Nevertheless, high levels of dynamic e±ciency in trading can be achieved
if the market for securities transactions is contestable, i.e. if competitive and inno-
vative infrastructure providers can gain market share at the expense of established
competitors. The diversion of trading volume is likelier the more of the following
aspects coincide: (1) A competing provider o®ers a signi¯cantly better service for
both user groups, i.e. to investors and issuers. This may be realized by a better
technology which could manifest in faster, more reliable or more convenient trans-
action handling. Another di®erentiation point could be lower listing standards for a
security which means less strict and thus less costly public disclosure requirements
for the securities issuer. (2) The competitor demands lower fees and thus investors
bene¯t by saving intermediation costs. Domowitz and Steil (1999, p. 8 - 9) give
several examples of this behavior. (3) The competitor o®ers new products or ser-
vices which have not been supplied and therefore 'monopolized' by an established
provider yet. (4) Additionally, over-the-counter trading and internalization of or-
der °ow by banks are also activities that divert trading volume from established
providers.
Concluding, we can state that, due to the strong network externalities and
economies of scale and scope in trading which o®er signi¯cant protection to estab-
lished competitors, it is likely that a certain level of dynamic ine±ciency will prevail
and will not be exploitable by competitors unless a signi¯cantly better service is
o®erable to the users. Thus, established providers that wish to stay in business
have to maintain service levels that are at least close to state of the art.
3.4.2 Clearing and settlement
Static e±ciency In the following, we will discuss the economic characteristics
of clearing and settlement together because of their largely similar character. In
analogy to trading, again an analysis of existing economies of scale, economies of
scope and network externalities play the main role in evaluating static e±ciency.
These economies are existent just as in the trading process while - additionally -
cost aspects for risk management play a pronounced role here.
Economies of scale and network externalities Clearing and settlement
providers are both required to invest signi¯cant amounts into the infrastructure of
their facilities. Thus, the lion's share of operating costs are ¯xed in nature which
implies that - once a provider is established - variable costs represent a small fraction
of total costs only. Hence, due to ¯xed costs degression average costs fall with
increasing transaction volume. This e®ect is stronger for electronically-powered
clearing and settlement infrastructures than for humanly-interfaced facilities due
to an even higher ¯x costs portion of total costs of the former. This intuition is
ascertained by ¯ndings of Schmiedel, MalkamÄ aki, and Tarkka (2002) who measure
signi¯cant economies of scale for settlement systems empirically.
As in trading there are viable positive network externalities on the user side
for both clearing and settlement. A single network enables all transactions to be
cleared and settled within the same system. It thereby increases the utility of all
users because no further links have to be established when relying on this monopoly
21This view is shared by Economides (1993, p. 92 - 93). He states that as a consequence of the
reinforcing nature, a ¯nancial "network exhibits positive critical mass". A further consequence
of networks "is that history matters [...] because of signi¯cant switching costs" which protect
established players in the market.
8solution. This is faster and less costly in comparison to processes which require the
interaction with several clearing and settlement systems. Additionally, if netting
mechanisms are used, the users will enjoy reduced capital provision requirements
and therefore lower opportunity costs.
Economies of scale are also present in counterparty risk management. Especially
if a central couterparty (CCP) is used in the clearing stage, the users of the facility
can save resources for the management and control of counterparty risks as this task
is centralized at the CCP. By pooling risk management facilities at the CCP, the
CCP can save costs by risk management specialization e®ects.22 As a consequence,
scale economies may be even more pronounced in clearing than in the settlement
stage.
Economies of scope Comparable to the trading process there are potential
economies of scope for both providers and users. The former are able to clear
and settle di®erent types of securities on the same platform while incurring only
relatively low incremental costs. The users on the other hand can save access and
back o±ce costs by focusing their activities on few providers.
Clearing facilities that process di®erent classes of securities such as stocks, bonds,
and derivatives have additional leeway for scope economies as they are able to im-
plement innovative risk management procedures such as cross-collateralizing along
di®erent securities classes. This would lead to an overall decrease in capital provi-
sion requirements to the users and would consequently save costs.
As with trading, we again have mutually reinforcing economies of scope e®ects
on both sides. We thus observe high levels of static e±ciency when the respective
activities are concentrated in few institutions.
Dynamic e±ciency Dynamic e±ciency rises with the level of competition. The
economies of both clearing and settlement clearly favor a highly concentrated market
from a static e±ciency perspective which in return may hurt dynamic e±ciency
due to fewer competitive elements. The contestability of the market is therefore
again the key measure for the dynamic e±ciency of the market. The question
thus arises, how di±cult it is for new market entrants to divert volume from an
established institution. We believe that due to the aforementioned economies this is
only possible when competitors o®er substantially better services.23 A superior o®er
to potential users would probably include but not be limited to faster processing,
lower transaction fees and lower capital provision requirements. The last aspect
may be a matter of regulatory concern as competing institutions might want to
apply less stringent and costly risk management in order to be able to successfully
underbid the fee structure of established competitors. This may lead to a 'race-
to-the-bottom' in terms of risk management quality which would undermine the
systemic e±ciency of the whole TCS-industry.24
Systemic e±ciency Systemic e±ciency is particularly relevant in the clearing
and settlement of securities and appendant funds. There are several sources of
and alleviation e®orts to systemic risks. Clearing and settlement institutions have
developed risk management tools that attempt to alleviate both ex ante and ex
post the various types of settlement risk. Since the various types of systemic risks
such as counterparty, custody and cross-border risks have been elaborated in other
22Confer also section 4.1.2.
23The contestability may also be hampered by the boundary decision of the established ¯rm: If
the upstream institution such as a trading platform also owns and controls institutions downstream,
it can route its orders to its own subsidiaries and therefore prevent other CS-institutions from
e®ectively competing for these transaction °ows. Confer section 5.1 for this issue.
24See more on this topic under sections 4.3 and 6.
9papers in detail25 our paper focuses on the relationship between systemic e±ciency
and market concentration.
The relationship between the degree of consolidation and systemic e±ciency in
the clearing and settlement industry is far from straight-forward. Both a fragmented
and a consolidated industry structure have to deal with trade-o®s.
A concentrated industry can exploit economies in centralizing risk management
e®orts as it is more cost e±cient to have one party collect the information and
to monitor the other parties instead of having all parties monitoring each other.
Thus, a central risk manager will be more cost e±cient and more sophisticated.
However, the central risk manager may bank too strongly on its dominant position
and believe that public entities would bail him out in case of a failure. Moral hazard
may materialize in the form of reduced monitoring e®orts. Therefore regulatory
e®ort - albeit rather easy as only one institution has to be controlled - might be
necessary.26 Additionally, a higher degree of consolidation leads to less complexity
in the interaction between the providers and thus reduces the probability of failures
in communication and asset transfers.
A fragmented industry structure on the other hand may provide systemic e±-
ciency that is superior to a concentrated market. More industry players will usually
lead to higher levels of competition. A possible parameter in the competition may
be the provision of the safest and most stable transaction system among providers
and may boost systemic e±ciency. Another positive aspect of fragmentation is
the existence of redundancies which - if communication protocols between di®erent
transaction systems are compatible - can be used to reroute transactions from a
failed to an intact system. Multiple transaction systems may thus increase the ro-
bustness of the industry although potential contagion e®ects between the providers
may weaken this advantage.
3.4.3 Vertical interdependencies
Vertical integration and e±ciency Historically, the dominant trading institu-
tion in each country often also exercised control in the activities further downstream,
i.e. the exchange vertically integrated into the domestic clearing and settlement ac-
tivities. This setting was mainly driven by e±ciency motives as it enabled to process
straight-through the whole transaction activity in a faster, more cost e±cient and
safer manner. Straight-through-processing (STP) at a single institution o®ered sig-
ni¯cant economies to both users and providers in comparison to the processing
between separate entities as: (1) It lowered communication costs between the re-
spective activities which means an improvement in static e±ciency. Since the whole
transaction was processed in-house, it was no longer necessary for a trading insti-
tution to transmit the details of the trade by mail or telephone but merely to hand
over the transaction details to the clearing and settlement department of the same
institution instead. (2) Innovations concerning the processing of transactions were
easier to implement since coordination e®orts with other providers along the value
chain were not necessary. This shortened the implementation period and therefore
increased dynamic e±ciency. (3) It made transaction failures less frequent since the
data transmission process could be optimized in-house, for example by implement-
ing own communication standards. This represented an improvement in systemic
e±ciency.
Nowadays, with the decline in IT-infrastructure costs, the arguments for vertical
integration are probably not as strong as they had been some ten years ago as
25See Giovannini Group (2001, p. 18 - 19) and de Bandt and Hartmann (2000).
26This phenomenon is generally called 'too big to fail'. Confer de Bandt and Hartmann (2000,
p. 17) for further details.
10transmission costs to outside institutions are now signi¯cantly less costly and not
necessarily higher than in-house transmission costs.
Furthermore, as trading habits of investors gradually shift from a domestic to-
wards a more international approach, the national 'silos', as the vertically integrated
entities are also called, not only no longer represent the investor's scope of trans-
action activities but are even said to hamper frictionless processing of cross-border
transactions in Europe. This is due to their incompatible proprietary communica-
tion standards which each national silo had developed to communicate along its own
controlled value chain. This makes communication between silos a highly complex
and ine±cient task.
Di®ering communication standards between vertical silos also de facto impede
the contestability of the respective downstream activities, i.e. clearing and settle-
ment markets. They represent an e®ective entry-barrier against foreign providers
that strive to enter the market of an established domestic silo. They are unable to
do so because once a trade is made on the established trading platform, competitors
are restricted to o®er their services for the downstream functions due to the existing
proprietary communication standard of the established provider. Therefore, clear-
ing and settlement activities of the established provider are protected by its trading
activity and are thus barely subject to contestability. This may result in dynamic
ine±ciencies.
E®ects of net clearing on trading and settlement The use of net clearing
instead of gross clearing procedures in the clearing stage has ambiguous e®ects on
activities both up- and downstream the value chain. While netting of obligations
is likely to boost trading activity due to an overall decrease in capital provision
requirement and thus freed-up capital it may also result ceteris paribus in less
settlement activity as only 'non-nettable' instructions are transmitted from clearing
to settlement.27 Yet, empirical analysis cannot verify with certainty whether the
increase in trading activity is large enough to make up for the initial decrease in
settlement transactions due to netting.28 This issue is of practical relevance for
settlement institutions as the introduction of a CCP with netting facilities can
be regarded as a threat to their revenues. Depending on whether the settlement
institution also controls the upstream clearing facility or not, the entity may want
to embrace or prevent such a clearing method. This means for vertical silos that -
as their revenues are merely shifted from settlement to clearing - netting is unlikely
to be rejected. In the contrary, a settlement-only institution may want to oppose
the implementation of netting.
4 Three classes of institutions - The relevant play-
ers
We distinguish three classes of institutions in our framework: (1) the institutions
that provide the infrastructure and services related to the three activities described
before, (2) the institutions that use these trading, clearing and settlement possibil-
ities and (3) the institutions that regulate the other two classes on various activity
levels.
27The National Securities Clearing Corporation, the US clearing institution, for example netted
roughly 95% of all transactions in recent years after introducing a CCP and netting procedures.
See http://www.dtcc.com for further details.
28See Global Custodian (2003) for a survey of empirical reports on this matter.
114.1 Providers of infrastructure and service
The main institutions in this class are exchanges, clearing houses and (interna-
tional) central securities depositories that provide single or multiple activities of
the securities value chain. We brie°y characterize all three in the following.
4.1.1 Exchanges
Exchanges are the main institutions where trading takes place. Their history points
back to the occasional meeting of merchants at fairs at a particular place at a
predetermined time.29 Today's exchanges mostly operate with a °oor-based trading
system that is supported by an electronic order system or they have taken the
next logical step and use an electronic order book as the sole device for trading.
Floor-based systems used to be the norm until the late 1980s when more and more
exchanges developed electronically based systems that ¯rst supported these trading
activities and later substituted for them by establishing an electronic order book.
Exchanges that resisted these forces for whatever reason soon found their dominant
position eroded and their competitive advantage gained in the past unsustainable.
Technology became a signi¯cant di®erentiation factor for trading platforms and
enabled technologically sophisticated competitors a relatively easy entry into mar-
kets that were dominated by technologically less pronounced competitors. Tech-
nological advances also supported the emergence of electronic trading networks
that are sponsored by information providers like Reuters and new entrants like the
Swedish OM Gruppen, that successfully established the ¯rst electronic derivatives
exchange in 1985.
Further changes are currently happening in the area of regulation of exchanges
as the balance between public oversight and private self-regulation changes. We will
deal with these issues in the section on regulation.
4.1.2 Clearinghouses
Why do clearing houses exist? For a typical over-the-counter transaction the
clearing process between buyer and seller is merely a bilateral agreement on mutual
obligations. While this process may be unproblematic if the two parties know their
counterparty's solvency and trust each other with respect to contract ful¯llment,
it represents a source of credit risk when performing transactions multilaterally at
an exchange with only limited information on other market participants. Thus, a
reliable transaction process calls for supervision of the trading partners' creditwor-
thiness during clearing.
Clearing houses are institutions that perform this function. They ensure fric-
tionless clearing as their customers, that are allowed to clear their own or their
clients' transactions, have to meet certain creditworthiness standards like trading
volume-dependent capital provision requirements. By e®ectively managing the risks
inherent in clearing, these institutions increase the e±ciency and strengthen the in-
tegrity of the ¯nancial markets.
Clearing with a central counterparty Traditionally, the clearing process is
performed among the market participants that have both obligations and claims
against each other. This method has two major drawbacks for them: First, al-
though capital provision requirements are mandatory to clearing members, there
nevertheless exist di®erent levels of credit risk among the participants. Second,
they are not able to remain anonymous during the clearing process.
29For a comprehensive history of ¯nancial markets and the advantages of agglomeration see
Holtfrerich (1999). A comprehensive elaboration on exchanges and the way they conduct business
can be found in Lee (1998).
12A central counterparty (CCP) can mitigate these problems by interposing itself
legally between the buyer and seller of a transaction. By stepping between the
original trading partners, the CCP becomes the buyer to every seller and the seller
to every buyer and thus ensures anonymity among market participants. This so-
called 'novation' process also helps to reduce counterparty risk as the CCP can
e®ectively apply sophisticated centralized risk management tools. When the CCP
uses the aforementioned netting mechanisms, the clearing members can also bene¯t
from lower overall capital requirements.30
4.1.3 Central securities depositories
Central securities depositories (CSDs) are institutions that centrally record and
monitor holdings of physical or dematerialized securities and that provide mecha-
nisms for their transfer by exchanging securities for cash. CSDs ensure that cash
and securities are promptly and e®ectively delivered between the parties to a trade,
and that customers are noti¯ed of the rights and obligations attached to the secu-
rities they keep under the custody of the central securities depositories. CSDs take
care for the timely and secure transfer of ownership of the securities and the match-
ing payment. They furthermore o®er securities lending for those trading partners
that want to sell securities short. Collateral and margin calls are also handled by
these institutions.
Whenever there is no immediate exchange of paper for money, problems in the
settlement can arise. These lead to risks that the contract partner have to bear.
Especially troublesome are ¯nancial claims that explicitly involve a longer time
dimension like derivative instruments.
A special breed of CSDs are the two International Central Securities Depositories
(ICSDs) that were originally established to manage the clearing and settlement of
the Eurobonds for which there was no supporting market infrastructure. These
institutions perform settlement services across national boundaries and connect
distinct markets via a so-called 'bridge' between them.
4.2 Users
The main institutions in this class are banks and brokers as the immediate users
of the infrastructure provided as well as securities issuers and investors as indirect
users. Banks play a pivotal role in the securities transaction value chain for in-
stitutional as well as retail investors on the one side and for companies with their
underwriting business on the other side.
4.2.1 Banks and brokers
Banks or any other institution that want to use the infrastructure provided by ex-
changes, clearing houses or central securities depositories usually have to undertake
signi¯cant investments. These investments are highly speci¯c to a particular infras-
tructure provider implying high switching costs and tremendously diminished ex
post competition. This induces strategic interactions between banks and brokers.
The co-specialized investments necessary for an e±cient use of the infrastructure
provided and the degree of this speci¯city in each bank is a means for banks to com-
pete with each other. Since network e®ects play a crucial role in the TCS industry,
the bigger banks, which can more easily a®ord to undertake these speci¯c invest-
ments, can foreclose the market for smaller banks for which such an investment is
30See Van Cauwenberge (2003, p. 94).
13not worthwhile. By internalizing security transactions and by acting as subcusto-
dians, banks are to a certain degree also direct competitors to the infrastructure
providers.31
Additionally, banks are especially concerned about the ¯nancial health of their
counterparty since they have to provide an adequate capital as a bu®er against
possible risks. Risk management tools can reduce such risks. Another risk mitigat-
ing instrument is a central counterparty which provides the task of monitoring the
creditworthiness of the parties related to a trade much like the banks themselves
act as delegated monitors for their lenders.32
4.2.2 Securities issuers and investors
Two other constituencies in the class of users are the issuers of securities and the
investors. Issuers list their securities on exchanges to establish a secondary market
in it. This increases the attractiveness of the securities for potential investors and
therefore also increases the capital that can be raised by the issuers. The settle-
ment of securities, especially the custody part of it, are of concern to the issuers:
Depending on the type of the security, they have to know the investor to invite
to general meetings for example. Investors - institutional as well as retail - are
mostly interested in the prices they have to pay for securities transactions and the
reliability with which the trade is executed and settled.
Unlike banks and brokers, investors do not have to make any co-specialized
investments to the infrastructure, so they can switch with ease to the platform that
performs in the most e±cient way. This forces the infrastructure provider, in the
case that there is competition, to reduce costs and to innovate thereby increasing
static as well as dynamic e±ciency.
4.3 Regulators
E±cient trading, clearing and settlement of securities is important for the function-
ing of the whole economy. Companies need to get access to ¯nance and private
households need a vehicle by which they can save their ¯nancial surpluses. This as-
signs ¯nancial markets in general and the TCS-industry in particular a pivotal role.
The well-being of other industries and many people depends on it. Adverse e®ects
spill over into other parts of the economy thereby implying negative externalities.
Therefore, regulation of the TCS-industry is a means to avoid or to mitigate these
external e®ects.
These spill-over e®ects are very material in the settlement stage of the securities
transaction value chain when the payment system is involved. A failure of one party
to meet its obligations might lead to contagion e®ects that have negative e®ects on
the liquidity of the banking system and threatening the economy by this transmis-
sion channel. The central bank as lender of last resort therefore has an incentive to
deal with these regulatory issues. It therefore needs to be - and also is - one of the
key regulating institutions since central bank money is frequently involved in set-
tling the cash side of securities transactions. Other regulatory bodies are concerned
with di®erent aspects: For example, the performance of each activity for all users
- which are of a considerable heterogeneous degree - in a fair manner needs to be
ensured, i.e. access to the infrastructure must be open and in an undiscriminating
way. The European Commission with various reports - the Lamfalussy Report, the
two reports of the Giovannini Group and the Investment Services Directive for ex-
ample - is committed to this task in the Single European Market. National agencies
31A model on the competitive relationship between CSDs and custodians can be found in
Holthausen and Tapking (2003).
32See Diamond (1984).
14implement actions to put these aspects into practice today. Regulators often join
their forces to set standards after consulting the relevant industry players, e.g. the
joint working group set up by the ECB and the Committee of European Securi-
ties Regulators (CESR). A single European Financial Services Authority might one
day take over this job. In all cases, the right balance between static, dynamic and
systemic e±ciency must be chosen by regulators.
The question arises how this regulatory body will be structured or how the
existing agencies will work together and communicate with each other. How large
and how important is, for example, the involvement of regulators in the payment
system and in the paper settlement system? In the former, interdependencies with
other payments that do not stem from transactions in securities have to be taken
into account as well.
The setting of the right incentive structure and the right allocation of decision
and control rights is a major task that needs thorough analysis that is beyond the
scope of this paper. The same holds for the implementation to achieve a good and
workable regulation that enhances and promotes the overall economy by ensuring
a smooth and e±cient functioning of the TCS-industry. One large regulator can
take into account all interdependencies between the di®erent stages of the securities
transaction value chain as described in section 3. However, such a super-regulator
is prone to lose its focus in a web of di®erent interest groups. Local information
might best be dealt with in a more decentralized structure. This makes a situation
where there are di®erent regulators for each activity and for the paper and the
payment side attractive. In such a setting, di®erent approaches to regulation like
self-regulation and the tightness of regulation can be ¯ne-tuned for each speci¯c
task. The °ip-side here is to ensure that necessary communication between these
regulators takes place and that no regulatory arbitrage is undertaken which would
lead to a race to the bottom.
Regulation lowers static e±ciency since it is costly to set up a bureaucracy - or
a publicly owned entity in the extreme - to achieve the performance of the three
activities in the securities transaction value chain. The 'out-sourcing' of regula-
tion to the providers and to the users of the infrastructure could be a cost-e±cient
alternative. Possible means for this outsourcing lie in the self-regulation by the
infrastructure provider. Whenever they can compete on quality as many exchanges
do with di®erent market segments and the attached regulatory conditions, regula-
tion need not be of the costly public variant. As a second means, the ownership
of the providers of infrastructure can be in the hands of the users. In this setting,
the club of users writes its own rules. Whenever little entry in this club is required,
this can again be better than publicly provided regulation.
5 Three parameters in the action set - strategic
conduct of the institutions
In this section we analyze three key parameters that the providers of the infrastruc-
ture, the users and the regulating institutions can use to interact strategically in the
securities transaction industry. The focus is on the providers of the infrastructure,
but possible actions and reactions of the other two classes of institutions are taken
into account whenever necessary. The three parameters in the action set that we
look at are (1) the boundary decision of the infrastructure providers, (2) the decision
whether to adopt an open standard or to develop a proprietary communication tool
and (3) the governance of the infrastructure providers.
155.1 Boundary decision
The institutions providing the infrastructure for trading, clearing and settling the
di®erent ¯nancial instruments face the problem whether to integrate di®erent as-
pects under the institutional roof of one ¯rm or whether to concentrate on just
one function or one speci¯c ¯nancial instrument. There are two dimensions to this
problem: The ¯rst is the horizontal decision. It requires an answer to the question
if the facilities should be only for one type of ¯nancial instrument or for di®erent
sorts of ¯nancial instruments such as stocks, bonds and derivatives. As described in
sections 3.4.1 and 3.4.2, there are potential economies of scope in pooling individual
activities of di®erent types of ¯nancial instruments. The second dimension is the
vertical decision. It requires an answer to the question if di®erent activity stages of
the securities transaction value chain should be integrated in one institution.
The following discussion on the providers' boundary decision concentrates on the
characteristics of the vertical dimension. We describe two distinct business models
- the vertically integrated silo and the vertically focused ¯rm.
The vertically integrated silo The ¯rst business model is the vertical silo -
the combination of trade, clearing and settlement under the roof of one ¯rm. It
is applied for example by Deutsche BÄ orse AG. The advantage of such a model is
that it allows to reap the bene¯ts that derive from the economies of scope between
the three functions as described in section 3.4.3. Communication is easier when
the three functions are performed in close proximity within the same organization.
Speci¯c forms of data exchanges between the three stages of the value chain and
straight-through processing allow for the emergence of economic rents.33
However, one of the adverse e®ects such a business model has, which might
be a prevalent microeconomic motive behind this strategy, is the leverage of a
(natural) monopoly on one stage of the value chain upstream or downstream to other
stages. Particularly, a vertical silo may cross-subsidize its trading costs - and thereby
attracting customers from other platforms - through its monopoly pro¯ts on the
clearing and settlement stage or vice versa. By this strategy, an institution following
the business model of vertical integration e®ectively strengthens its competitive
position. Furthermore, the vertical silo forecloses the market for competitors: By
restricting access for them in one activity, users can be forced also to 'buy' the
solution for another activity from the same institution. If there is no choice for
them but to deal with the same provider, a monopoly rent can be extracted from
the users further increasing the economic rents generated in this model due to the
speci¯city inherent in it.
Therefore, the interesting question arises whether Clearstream and Deutsche
BÄ orse can deliver their promises given that they control upstream activities and de
facto can foreclose the market due to their monopoly on the previous stage in the
value chain. When faced with the speci¯c and co-specialized investments they have
to undertake, banks and brokers could be reluctant to join in this venture.
The vertically focused ¯rm The other business model that has promising fea-
tures is that of more focused infrastructure providers and the use of market mech-
anisms between them. A prominent example for this industry setting was used
in England, where the three independent institutions, namely London Stock Ex-
change, London Clearing House and Crest, provided infrastructure services only for
one stage of the value chain, respectively.34 If a solution for the communication
problem of data transfer between the three activities of the securities transaction
33See Williamson (1985) for the role of speci¯city in explaining vertical integration.
34The London Clearing House has recently teamed up with Euronext's Clearnet, whereas Crest
has merged with Euroclear in 2002.
16value chain could be found, this model has appeal because it does not give too much
power into the hands of few institutions that can control access to their infrastruc-
ture - an infrastructure that exhibits strong network e®ects. For each activity, the
users can choose the best institution that provides it in the most e±cient way -
from the static point of view as well as from the dynamic perspective. Competition
forces less e±cient institutions out of business and sets high-powered incentives for
the surviving. As such ¯rms do not have to worry about any interdependencies be-
tween their di®erent lines of business, they are more eager to adopt new and better
technologies and processes. Any cannibalization of value propositions within the
same ¯rm cannot happen. These institutions increase therefore static and dynamic
e±ciency. A possible drawback which might be taken into account by the regula-
tors is less systemic stability that too high-powered incentives might induce. How
the problem of establishing a market mechanism for the intermediate goods - the
information transfer from one stage to the next in the value chain - can be dealt
with is the topic of the next section.
5.2 Communication standards and accessibility
The interaction between the stages of the value chain is of crucial importance to the
way business is performed in the TCS industry. It necessitates the infrastructure
providers to make decisions both on the information transfer mode, i.e. the type
of communication standard, and the degree of accessibility of their activities to
competitors.
Proprietary versus open communication standards Proprietary standards
infer that the information format of the transactions cannot be interpreted without
co-specialized investments so that competitors are discriminated whereas an open
standard enables competitors to process the information and allows users to switch
the providers more easily.35
The decision whether to adopt an open standard or to set up a proprietary
system is intertwined with the vertical boundary decision. In the case of a vertically
focused infrastructure provider, the case is trivial. Such an institution has to rely
on the market for the performance of upstream and downstream activities, the
communication protocol has to be in an open and understandable format.36 The
case is di®erent for companies following the business model of a vertical silo: Such
companies can develop a solution that allows them to keep the information that
has to be passed along the securities transaction value chain private. By doing so,
it can develop an idiosyncratic data exchange format that allows them to generate
an economic rent due to the speci¯c nature.
However, an economic rent could also be generated by foreclosing the market
for an upstream or downstream activity. Users are forced to rely on the same
institution and buy the bundled product in a one-stop shop. They have to invest
in co-specialized computer systems that allow them to handle this proprietary data
format. With an open communication standard between the di®erent stages of
the value chain a deconstruction becomes possible. There would be a choice for
customers to deal with the best and most e±cient institution.
Analyzing open and proprietary communication standards on the basis of our
three e±ciency concepts there are two major advantages for proprietary in compar-
35The battle for an unique communication standard and the di®erent competing approaches are
described in Weitzel, Martin, and KÄ onig (2003).
36One could also imagine the case that a proprietary standard is used. In this case, the outcome
would be a hybrid solution along the lines of Williamson (1985): Long-term contracts or strategic
alliances are necessary to account for the hold-up problem since speci¯c investments have to be
made.
17ison to open communication standards: (1) They can be more speci¯c in relation
to a certain ¯nancial instrument or a certain institution than open communication
standards and thus be more statically e±cient. (2) A higher dynamic e±ciency can
be reached since a proprietary communication standard allows for the complete ap-
propriation of the economic rent that is generated by innovations. Additionally, the
bene¯ts of innovations made with open standards could be enjoyed by every partic-
ipants without being obliged to invest into this innovation. Thus, underinvestment
problems may arise with open standards.
However, proprietary communication has also two major drawbacks when com-
pared to open standards: (1) Proprietary standards provide more incentives for
strategic behavior to infrastructure providers which can be to the detriment of the
users. Thus, market foreclosure strategies and mutual reinforcements of monopolies
on di®erent stages of the value chain can have a negative impact on users. Both
static and dynamic e±ciency may be impeded. A communication standard that is
open to all market participants prevents or at least alleviates these strategic be-
haviors: It is easier for competitors of the infrastructure provider or for the users
themselves by means of internalization to work around such a foreclosure. (2) Pro-
prietary standards raise more regulatory concerns if a regulator wants to ensure
the proper functioning of the market and access for other institutions. Therefore,
static e±ciency may be lowered due to the increased regulation costs. Additionally,
systemic e±ciency may be low if regulators do not control the proprietary standard
properly.
Restricted versus open accessibility Accessibility in this context refers to in-
teractions between competitors across di®erent stages of the value chain, i.e. between
trading and clearing or between clearing and settlement. Open access describes the
ability of institutions to provide their services on one stage of a transaction although
other stages of the value chain may be performed by competitors. This stands in
contrast to transactions where access is restricted by a provider. Restriction of ac-
cess is possible whenever a provider is able to leverage its dominant position on other
stages of the value chain. This may for example occur when a dominant trading
facility prevents other providers of downstream activities to receive the transaction
and automatically route it to their own clearing facility instead. Another example
for dominance can be found in the opposite direction, when a settlement provider
has the monopoly on a certain security and refuses to accept transactions that are
traded or cleared from anybody but its own upstream activity provider. Therefore
restricted accessibility can strongly impede fair competition among providers in the
TCS-industry.37
Accessibility as well as the standard decision primarily depend on the industry
structure38, the allocation of power between the three classes of institutions, and
the governance and ownership of the providers of the infrastructure. Using (or
being forced by a regulatory institution to use) a common means of communication
technology, e®ectively opens markets. The power that is conveyed by open markets
to users allows them to search for the best price and quality. This in turn eventually
forces a redistribution of economic rents away from the incumbent providers who
would otherwise hang on to an ine±cient allocation of resources from a welfare
perspective. It is to these governance aspects that we turn next.
37See also Milne (2002) who proposes to regulate access to the book transfer (which would fall
into the settlement activity in our framework) as he identi¯es it as the natural monopoly within
the clearing and settlement industry.
38There is a strong interdependency and complementarity between accessibility, communication
standard and vertical boundary decision of the providers: We observe the tendency that a vertically
integrated ¯rm often employs a proprietary standard with restricted access while a vertically
focused ¯rm prefers open standards and open accessibility.
185.3 Ownership structure and governance
Ownership of a good is an incentive device: When residual decision rights are
aligned with the rights to residual income, decisions are made in such a way as to
maximize this share. The maximization of it optimizes social welfare whenever these
decisions can be made independent of others. It therefore matters who ultimately
has control over a certain good or resource. This is also the case for a ¯rm - a
much more complex 'good' and a whole bundle of resources. For our analysis, we
take into account the ownership structure of a provider of the infrastructure in the
securities transaction value chain to check whether economically sound decisions will
be made by this institution. Three distinct forms of ownership can be identi¯ed:
(1) A for-pro¯t ¯rm that operates to maximize the pro¯t that is distributable to
its shareholders as dividends, (2) a non-pro¯t mutual that operates to maximize
the utility of its members and (3) a publicly-owned entity that provides a good or
service that would not be provided e±ciently by a private ¯rm due to its public
good nature and the underlying external e®ects.
Public ownership of an infrastructure provider can be a means to deliver a service
that must be provided by a natural monopolist. The public policymaker - acting
in the interest of society as a whole - is not interested in narrow pro¯t motives but
rather tries to provide this service in the e±cient quantity. This gain is however
very likely to be o®set by ine±ciencies that public bodies bring with them. Without
a pro¯t motive the resulting incentives in the publicly owned '¯rm' are weakened
and ine±ciencies are re-introduced.
In the last years, many publicly-owned monopolies in diverse industries were
therefore privatized and for-pro¯t ¯rms were established instead. In this form of
ownership - the standard capitalist form most commonly analyzed in economic the-
ory - the residual decision rights are aligned with the residual claims and better
incentives are thereby conveyed. The public interest of the provision of the right
quantity for the correct price in these network industries is better served by a regu-
lator that has less decision power (and less potential for meddling) than an outright
publicly owned enterprise. The shift in control and power away from a public au-
thority towards the private agents that use and provide the infrastructure increases
overall welfare by nurturing better decisions because the resulting economic rents
are exploitable by these decision makers.
The third point in the triangle of possible ownership arrangements is that of mu-
tual ownership. In the mutual form, the users of the infrastructure also provide the
necessary investments themselves so that the statically e±cient quantity is produced
for a price that is lower than the monopoly price. The direct users are members in
the providing institution and take into account the supplementing function that the
infrastructure has for their core business in which they ultimately want to generate
economic rents. The amount of economic rent that is generated in such a mutually-
owned institution is therefore lower compared to a for-pro¯t ¯rm while ine±ciencies
are reduced in comparison to a publicly-owned and over-regulated authority. Such
a structure has its drawbacks however. The membership of the mutual can procras-
tinate and new entrants can be discouraged from using the same infrastructure. If
the members are too heterogeneous between them, the governance of 'one member
- one vote' instead of 'one share - one vote' can cause decisions to be distorted by
the divergent interests and the larger players can be held up by the smaller institu-
tions. In recent years there has been a wave of demutualizations, especially among
exchanges, due to these problems. 39
39See also Domowitz and Steil (1999, p. 14 - 16) on this issue.
19Why are ownership and governance aspects important? The governance
of the infrastructure providers is of particular importance for the e±ciency with
which securities transactions are performed. The Council of Institutional Investors
- representing 130 pension funds holding 3 trillion dollars in assets in the USA -
criticizes that of the three constituencies of the New York Stock Exchange - members
(intermediaries like broker-dealers and specialists), listed companies and investors -
only the members are allowed to vote and to choose the board. This structure has
a potential negative e®ect on the self-regulation of the exchange since that is biased
towards the members' interests.40
The governance structure also in°uences the ability of a ¯rm to innovate and to
be e±cient in a more dynamic sense. Too much power in the wrong hands hinders
the necessary innovation in the face of disruptive technologies. The introduction
of electronic trading systems for example was heavily fought by °oor-based brokers
that have an important voice in the governance of exchanges. When these are not
only the users of the infrastructure but can also exert power through a mutual
ownership arrangement, they can block such innovations that would make them
worse o® but lead to big gains for other users.
5.4 Interdependencies between the parameters and its con-
¯gurations
All three described action parameters are not independent of each other. We want
to highlight some interdependencies here as a precursor to the analysis of the three
systems compared in section 6.4.
The relationship between the boundary decision and the communication
standards Open standards are a means to credibly commit an institution per-
forming a certain function in the securities transaction value chain not to pursue a
foreclosure strategy by vertical integration. The leveraging of a natural monopoly
on one stage of the value chain for a certain ¯nancial instrument cannot be used
to force customers to use the infrastructure of the same institution on the previ-
ous or next stage in the value chain as well. The choice for customers and the
threat of market entry by upstarts do not allow institutions to use their power to
extract more than their 'fair' share of economic rents generated by the activities
of the securities transaction value chain. This makes a strategy of vertical inte-
gration less attractive. On the contrary, in such a setting it would be necessary
for the integrated institution to compete with many focused ¯rms that know their
activity by heart. Any advantage in terms of higher economic rents these focused
institutions can gain can only come from better service which leads them to pursue
a strategy that puts a premium on innovation. Even if the vertically integrated
¯rm also pursued aggressive R&D activities, it would be faced with the dilemma of
cannibalizing its own success whenever it came across an innovation on one stage
of the securities transaction value chain that would force it to restructure the re-
lationship between the integrated stages. The need to meddle with transfer prices
weakens incentives for middle managers or even leads to outright sabotage of the
new product or process by the managers of the less innovative stage.
The relationship between ownership structure and communication stan-
dard Economic rents can be generated by for-pro¯t ¯rms by suitably using the
ideas of industrial organization theory to structure the industry to make it more
di±cult to enter the market. One such tool is a proprietary standard probably in
combination with a strategy of vertical integration. In the other two ownership
40See Economist (2003, p. 59) for this example.
20forms we described - public and mutual ownership - these incentives to foreclose the
market by opting for a proprietary communication standard are not that promi-
nent since the appropriation possibilities of any rents generated are less good for
the owners of such institutions. In the case of a publicly provided infrastructure of
the natural monopoly functions this institution will settle on its own (proprietary)
standard but fair access is usually granted by the provider of the public good. In the
case of a mutual ownership structure the tendency is for an open communication
standard because the users themselves will gain from less diversity between di®er-
ent providers since they then have to invest only in one system to cope with data
from numerous institutions on the other stages of the securities transaction value
chain. However, incentives to develop the common standard and to take account
of better possibilities in data exchange through broadband connections and better
encryption and decompression algorithms are needed. One possibility is the use of
open source-like structures: Franck and Jungwirth (2002) see the advantage of such
structures in donations that are made by interested institutions without a crowding
out of valuable investments in the case of an emerging standard. Cooperatives are
then a preferable institutional setting in the case establishing a standard without
the e®ects of competition that would lead to a fragmentation or to a lock-in in an
ine±cient system.41
The relationship between the boundary decision and ownership structure
Mutually owned institutions have their drawbacks in terms of slow decision making
and weakened incentives due to the lack of the pro¯t motive. Vertical integration
augments this disadvantage by making the institution even more complex. The
users of the infrastructure for the securities transaction value chain are therefore
more likely to set up several cooperatives each one highly focused along the value
chain that have probably di®erent members and to rely on open standards for the
exchange of information between them. The users themselves restrict the activities
of a cooperative to the absolut necessary.
The solution of public ownership is more likely to be vertically integrated but a
sensible and economically minded policy maker would again opt for a deconstruc-
tion of the value chain and a private provision for the activities where this is the
best option. Unregulated private institutions run in the best interest of their share-
holders, i.e. without ignoring incentives for managers to engage in empire-building
activities, are very likely to pursue a strategy to shape the industry in their favor
and to erect entry barriers whenever possible. As mentioned before, a foreclosure
strategy of leveraging a monopoly position from one activity to the next makes
perfect sense for such institutions. Privately owned companies are therefore likely
to increase their scale and scope by actively integrating along the value chain when
no countervailing forces prevail.
We have now outlined the constituents of our framework and discussed them
in detail. In the following section we put these parameters together to concen-
trate on the systemic relationships between them that make some combinations of
parameters in our framework better from an socially e±cient viewpoint than others.
6 Three proposals for a sensible TCS-system
Systems in general consist of various modules. Between these modules or elements
there can be a complementary relationship. Complementarity between any two such
41For a theoretical underpinning of cooperatives and their investment incentives in emerging
standards see the work of Rey and Tirole (2001).
21elements implies that the simultaneous increase in both elements leads to an overall
superior performance. In the case that such a complementary relation between the
elements of a system exists, the right con¯guration of these modules matters. Only
if they are adjusted in a coherent fashion, the system in question will be internally
consistent. Such a consistent system will perform better than any system in which
deviations from the coherent con¯guration in one or a few parameters occur.42
This section presents three sensible and idealized systems where the con¯gu-
rations of selected elements, especially the parameters of the action set described
above, are set thus that the complementary relationship is taken account for and
the overall system is e±cient from the viewpoint of a benevolent system designer.
Small deviations from the con¯gurations suggested lead to an overall less e±cient
solution.
6.1 System 1 - Regulated consolidation
Description The system of regulated consolidation has two distinct features im-
plied by its name: (1) there is no competition in the provision of the activities on
those levels of the securities transaction value chain that are consolidated and (2)
the role of the regulating institutions is very pronounced in these stages. Usually
the roles of regulators and providers are combined and the infrastructure is publicly
owned.
The horizontally consolidated and possibly even vertically integrated structure
can take several forms. We want to mention three idealized con¯gurations here:
(1) Model T: This structure is consolidated on both the clearing and settlement
stage whereas trading remains fragmented. The approach comes quite close to the
actual structure in the USA, where the Depositories Trust & Clearing Corporation
is the monopoly for clearing and settlement activities and trading occurs on several
exchanges. (2) Model I: This structure resembles a monopoly on all three stages.
The institutions may or may not be vertically integrated. The structure comes close
to the setting of the TCS-industry in many European countries a few years ago,
i.e. before the introduction of the Single European Market integrated the various
national markets. (3) Model X: This structure has one consolidated clearing insti-
tution which may also perform as a CCP. Both trading and settlement activities
remain more fragmented. This approach for the future of the TCS-industry in the
European Union was advocated by London Stock Exchange's former chairman, Don
Cruickshank.43
For conciseness reasons, we will describe model I in detail as the most extreme
version of regulated consolidation. Models T and X merely represent weaker versions
of consolidation and thus could be described analogously.
The consolidation in each activity allows to reap economies of scale and scope
along the securities transaction value chain. The public ownership and the lack of
competition lead to low incentives to innovation activity. The threat of entry is
subdued since the underlying economies as well as the publicly sanctioned role as
the sole provider entrench this institution.
Vertical integration even enhances this entrenchment but leads also to the pos-
sibility of straight-through processing and an e±cient use and dissemination of in-
formation from one stage of the value chain to the next. The low rate of innovation
42Mathematically, complementarity relates to a positive cross-derivative: The ¯rst-order returns
for the increase in one element are still more enhanced if the second element is also increased.
Consistency is the characteristic that any pairwise combination between any two elements has a
non-negative cross-derivative - also referred to as a supermodular relationship - between them.
See Milgrom and Roberts (1990) for an application of system theory in the context of modern
manufacturing. See Hackethal (2000) and Topkis (1998) for a more mathematical approach.
43See http://www.londonstockexchange.com/newsroom/speeches/speech08.asp for a transcript
of his speech, 07.09.2003
22and the resulting stability in the industry makes it feasible to write detailed plans.
The low innovation activity is also consistent with a low investment propensity of
all players and low total investments. The users of the infrastructure are willing to
undertake the necessary co-specialized investments. The standardization process is
organized by the regulator which uses its powerful position to enforce and set the
standard means of communication. The sum of total investments is low since no
company can compete with such a vertically integrated, publicly owned institution
that uses the underlying economies of scale and scope.
Figure 2 provides an illustration of the three idealized industry settings as well
as the position of the power center between the three classes of institutions.
Figure 2: TCS-System 1: Regulated Consolidation
E±ciency analysis Static e±ciency in these settings is relatively high due to the
strong exploitation of network, scale and scope economies. The signi¯cant market
power of the providers has its counterweight in the public ownership structure so
that the ine±ciencies of a monopoly does not prevail. However, the incentive struc-
ture within a big public agency brings also some costs in terms of lost e±ciency. It
depends on the actual processes and organizational structures of this body whether
the combined e®ect is still positive.
Dynamic e±ciency is rather low due to the lack of competition. The pressure
for product or service innovations will remain limited to the detriment of the users.
The overall investment activity is too low and potential competitors are deterred
from entering the industry.
The analysis of systemic e±ciency in these settings has a two-sided result.
Consolidation enables the centralization of risk management at the infrastructure
providers which can be more e±cient than a decentralized risk management solu-
tion. However, as mentioned above, moral hazard aspects such as the reduction
of risk management e®orts due to a too-big-to-fail-feeling may endanger systemic
e±ciency in these settings.
The regulating institutions are the center of power in the system of regulated
consolidation. Ideally, this should reduce potential moral hazard issues in risk
management, ensure fair transaction prices for the users, i.e. the users should bene¯t
from exploited scale economies. However, regulation itself is costly so that increasing
systemic e±ciency will lead to a loss in dynamic e±ciency. This system is most
notably interesting when static e±ciency aspects outweigh dynamic considerations.
This may be the case when disruptive innovations are expected to be rather rare in
the future and the processes in the industry are settled and stable.
6.2 System 2 - Competitive fragmentation
Description In contrast to system 1 the market structure of system 2 is rather
scattered, i.e. it features polypolistic characteristics including several providers for
23trading, clearing and settlement. A high level of competition on all stages of the
securities transaction value chain leads to a high rate of technological innovation.
The fragmented industry structure necessitates the use of open standards since the
users have to undertake co-specialized investments. Open standards and good access
possibilities allow for new institutions to enter the market easily whenever they see
¯t. This is consistent with the high rate of innovation that is increased by such new
entrants. The tendency to invest is high since it can be the basis of Schumpeterian
rents. The resulting overall investment level is therefore possibly too high when too
many uncoordinated investments are undertaken. Over-investment and a resulting
bubble can lead to cycles of investments that exacerbate the economic cycle and
the ups and downs of ¯nancial markets.
The ownership of these ¯rms rests in private hands since that is the most e±cient
incentive tool to sustain the needed rate of technological progress to keep this system
stable. The role of the regulators is very subdued: Any exaggerated activity by
them would lead to a lowering of investment incentives for the private companies
that then would have to fear a meddling of the regulators. The only activity they
should engage in is to ensure the open access. Self-regulation by the competing
providers is a means for them to di®erentiate themselves from their competitors
and attract more users and a better competitive advantage. The epicenter of power
lies with the privately owned providers or with the users. The tendency for vertically
integrating the securities transaction value chain is low: Cross-subsidies from one
stage to the next are not possible due to the ¯erce competition on each stage and
the reluctance for change in such a vertically integrated institution that is faced
with cannibalizing its own success whenever new processes or products occur makes
it a suboptimal solution.
Figure 3 provides an illustration of the industry setting as well as the position
of the power center.
Figure 3: TCS-System 2: Competitive Fragmentation
E±ciency analysis Static e±ciency is low in this setting. The relatively small
size of the providers does not allow for the harvest of network, scale and scope
economies. Consolidation e®orts exist, but a constant stream of new industry en-
trants armed with new, innovative products and services prevent the creation of
one dominant monopoly. A system with several relatively small market partici-
pants prevails.
Dynamic e±ciency on the other hand is high due to ¯erce competition and low
entry barriers of the market. Open communication standards ensure that providers
with better services will be able to o®er their service to users without being strongly
hampered by established providers. Even users such as banks can e®ectively threat
providers to internalize transactions should they not be satis¯ed with existing prod-
ucts and services. An exact con¯guration of the elements is necessary to keep this
system stable between two countervailing forces. On the one hand, an industry
24setting with open standards may not provide enough incentives for the providers
to develop the standardized technology further due to free-riding inducements. On
the other hand, uncoordinated investments can lead to value destruction when too
much is invested in boom times of a cycle. The system has therefore to strike a
delicate balance between this under- and overinvestment problem.
Systemic e±ciency is rather high. Although this setting has no (public) reg-
ulator but is mainly self-regulated, the robustness in the provision of securities
transaction possibilities is nevertheless quite high. The driving factor is the compe-
tition among providers, in this case, the competition for the most stable and secure
transaction system. Thus, infrastructure providers have an incentive to compete on
quality and create a safe TCS-environment for their clients. However, an important
precondition for this scenario is the transparency of the providers' risk manage-
ment e®orts to the users. If it is di±cult for the latter to evaluate the quality of
risk management, the providers may have the adverse incentive to boost pro¯tabil-
ity by cutting down on costly risk management procedures and endanger systemic
e±ciency. This race-to-the-bottom e®ect may be prevented by a user-dominated
governance structure.
Another positive aspect of the competitive fragmentation on systemic e±ciency
is that the fragmented market structure which is characterized by high levels of
infrastructure redundancies and open standards enables a relatively easy re-routing
of transactions in emergency cases. Ample substitution possibilities for the users
and low switching costs due to open communication standards ensure systemic
robustness in times of the failure of one institution. However, depending on the
nature of an adverse systemic event, contagion between the di®erent transaction
systems may occur and thus neutralize the positive redundancy aspects.
A system of competitive fragmentation is particularly interesting in a dynam-
ically changing environment when returns on innovations are high and static e±-
ciency considerations are dominated by dynamic e±ciency aspects.
6.3 System 3 - Contestable monopolies
Description There are two crucial characteristics to the third system we propose:
(1) the market for infrastructure providers is more or less consolidated and (2) com-
munication between the industry participants - both horizontally and vertically - is
performed via open standards. New entrants into the market are able to communi-
cate with the others and are granted access to established providers. The e±cient
size with respect to scale and scope economies limits the number of direct competi-
tors on each horizontal stage and natural monopolies prevail. Vertical integration is
rather detrimental in such a system since the monopoly positions on di®erent stages
could be used strategically by the providers to re-enforce rent extraction possibilities
in other activities to the disadvantage of the users. Two possibilities exist by which
such behavior can be ruled out: For one, a public regulator can ensure open access
and can limit any vertical integration attempts. For the other, the users themselves
can mutually own the necessary infrastructure and restrict such behavior by the
management of the provider in question. Depending on which concept is used to
restrict the infrastructure provider to capture too large a slice of the economic rents,
the epicenter of power is somewhere between the regulators and the users.
Open standards and guaranteed access allow new entrants to enter the market
and thereby limit the rent appropriation potential of the incumbent further. With
better products or processes they are in a good position to challenge the incumbent
and to gain the upper hand eventually. The rate of technological progress and
innovation is therefore higher than in system 1 of a regulated monopoly. The
investment propensity and also total investment are higher since the incumbent has
to keep up with the innovative progress or risks to become obsolete and to lose his
25position to an upstart. Again, self-regulation can be a means of competition with
the better quality and stability gaining an advantage. This allows to reduce the
public regulation and the costs associated with it.
Figure 4 shows three idealized industry settings in analogy to system 1. The
¯rms with dashed lines illustrate potential new entrants into the industry.
Figure 4: TCS-System 3: Contestable Monopolies
E±ciency analysis Static e±ciency in a system of contestable monopolies is
enhanced in this setting due to the high level of consolidation in the three stages
of the value chain.44 The existence of a quasi-monopolistic infrastructure enables
full exploitation of existing economies of scale and scope and network e®ects. Static
e±ciency gains are passed on to the users in this system as each level on the value
chain is contestable to market entries due to open communication standards. Fur-
thermore, the costs of regulation can be kept to a minimum and is not distorting
investment incentives for the providers.
Dynamic e±ciency is also high and is achieved by the open standards architec-
ture which results in contestability in each activity and low barriers to entry. This
prevents the existing monopolist from appropriating large portions of a monopoly
rent as potential entrants with better service o®erings pose an e®ective threat. Nev-
ertheless, some barriers to entry still exist such as liquidity in a certain security on
the trading level, and allow a monopolist to reap rents from his dominant market
position. These rents further ensure that the incumbent has a strong incentive to
maintain this position and react to the incentives provided thereby. As mentioned
in section 5.2, there are also some drawbacks to open communication standards
with regard to dynamic e±ciency aspects such as potential free-riding behavior in
the development of innovations.
Systemic e±ciency is high in this system. The setting bene¯ts from its two
main characteristics of being rather consolidated and having open communication
standards. The former aspect enables the industry to centralize its risk manage-
ment at one institution while the latter ensures competition for the most stable
transaction system so that the quasi-monopolist is forced to maintain a high qual-
ity of risk management in order not to lose users to other providers. Additionally,
open communication standards enable a wider proliferation of knowledge on the
transmission of transaction data. As communication becomes common knowledge,
it is likely that market participants react faster and better on systemic emergency
events. However, contestability of the market may also bring along adverse aspects
such as the aforementioned race-to-the-bottom incentives for the provider. An ef-
fective no-bail-out commitment by governments or central banks may prevent the
monopolist from assuming himself to be too-big-to-fail.
44We again limit ourselves to analyze the e±ciencies of model I as the ¯ndings hold also true
for the less extreme models in a weaker manner.
266.4 Comparison of the systems
The three systems described above are all consistent systems that maximize social
welfare in the sense that no small deviation from the con¯guration of its elements
would lead to further improvements. In this section we compare the three systems
and evaluate their relative merits and drawbacks. In particular we pose the following
questions:
² How stable are these three systems when small deviations from the optimal
con¯guration occur and how likely is a system to deteriorate into an inconsis-
tent system that is ine±cient given the micro-motives of the di®erent institu-
tions?
² Which of these three system dominates the other two systems when social
welfare is to be maximized, i.e. which system is the global optimum?
Stability of the systems and the threat of ine±cient systems The system
of regulated consolidation is very stable and not in danger of falling apart easily once
its elements are con¯gured in a consistent way. By its ownership of the infrastructure
providing institutions or by the power it devolved to its regulating institutions the
government commits credibly to stay in this system. New entrants cannot upset
this system and the incumbent monopolist has only weak incentives to engage in
innovative activities. The stability itself puts a positive feedback into the system
since long-range planning and routinization become possible that lower the cost
imposed by regulation.
The system is little prone to deteriorate into an ine±cient system: In many
European countries dominant regulated monopolies along the securities transaction
value chain ensured that the underlying economies of scale and scope could be
reaped without incurring too big a social welfare loss due to e±cient regulation.
By striking the right balance between these costs, securities trading, clearing and
settlement in national markets is highly e±cient, at least from a static and systemic
point of view. The past has shown that such a system needs a very big shock - like
the integration of formerly apart ¯nancial markets into the single European one -
to overcome its inertia.
The system of competitive fragmentation is not very stable and small deviations
from the consistent con¯guration can lead to a deterioration into an ine±cient
setting. If, for example, too much uncoordinated investments are undertaken, the
problem of over-investing arises. If a bubble builds and pops subsequently due to
any su±cient macroeconomic shock, it can force these investors to sell many assets
below their value. Many providers become insolvent and are forced to leave the
industry. A consolidation process is started by the institutions that are in a better
position.
These institutions start to consolidate horizontally to achieve greater economies
of scale and increase the degree of static e±ciency. They also integrate vertically
to safeguard this horizontal expansion and to leverage the resulting market power.
Since all institutions concentrate on getting ¯nancially sound again, the rate of
technological innovation drops, new entry looks less attractive and the whole system
can transire to one of the other systems or falls into ine±ciency if no regulation
is introduced, to keep the market contestable or if the ownership is reorganized
to a more mutual structure (which is the less likely possibility). The surviving
institutions can extract too much of the economic rent and their monopoly power
is not compensated by a regulating institution.
The system of contestable monopolies is equally hard to sustain. A monopolist
on one stage of the securities transaction value chain for example, might be tempted
to integrate forwards or backwards. Such a merger of two dominant monopolies
27might look good at ¯rst sight: By integrating the two institutions the communi-
cation between them can be streamlined and straight-through processing might be
facilitated to the bene¯t of the users. Open access is guaranteed by the acquiring
institution and formally assured by the small regulator. However, the realization
in practice might look di®erent and many potential entrants are deterred by the
more entrenched position of the merged institution. The combined provider itself
can therefore rest more easily and does not have to engage in as many development
activities as would be necessary in a consistently con¯gured system as described in
section 6.3. The institution can instead divert its e®orts towards rent-seeking and
engage in investments in the 'open' communication standard that slightly favors its
own business. If regulation is not adjusted accordingly towards a stronger regime,
such an institution can lower the overall amount of economic rent that is generated
thereby decreasing social welfare. At the same time it can gain an economic rent
that is bigger than in a consistently con¯gured system.
Like the system of competitive fragmentation the system of contestable mo-
nopolies is prone to deteriorate when even small deviations from the consistent
con¯guration occur. The micro-motives of the infrastructure providing institutions
will generally lead to a situation in which a monopoly prevails that is entrenched
by vertical integration, a proprietary communication standard and an ownership
structure that places too little weight on the bene¯t of the users and society as a
whole. Such a mixture of di®erent con¯gurations will not maximize overall welfare.
Evaluation of the systems and global optimum Sofar we have not said if
one of the idealized system is better than the others. Calculating an exact ¯gure
for social welfare in each of the three systems is nearly impossible: Too many
parameters would need to be measured and too many errors would be made in
measuring the e±ciency of the involved institutions. We therefore restrict ourselves
to indications only. Which of the three systems might be the global optimum
that dominates the others? The system of regulated consolidation produces at an
e±cient level so that economies of scale and scope can be reaped. However, it fares
poorly when dynamic aspects of e±ciency are taken into account. No investment
incentives are set and the cost of regulation or public ownership further decreases
the overall welfare generated by this system.
The system of competitive fragmentation scores especially when these aspects of
dynamic e±ciency are important. However, due to the small scale of the providing
institutions too little of the underlying economies are utilized. The system su®ers
also from the coordination problem between the many institutions so that too many
duplicate and incompatible investments are undertaken. The system of contestable
monopolies does not have these drawbacks once con¯gured in a consistent way:
The small number of institutions deploys the underlying economies of scale and
scope and the limited role of the regulator ensures that these costs are kept to a
minimum as well. The market stays open for new entrants so that improvements
due to innovations need not to be forgone.
This guesstimate leads to the conclusion that the third system of contestable
monopolies is the best and should be implemented when possible. A caveat however
must be applied since this system is of rather instable nature and prone to slide
down towards an ine±cient system of unregulated monopoly.
287 The transition of the securities transaction in-
dustry in the EU
The introduction of the Single European Market was a strong catalyst that upset
the system of regulated consolidation that many European countries had in place.
Many features of the established system were suddenly and simultaneously changed.
By simply opening the markets and leaving all else unchanged, the result however
is ine±cient. Too many inconsistent con¯gurations of important elements are in
place: Too many regulators increase the costs and thereby decrease social welfare.
Publicly owned or heavily regulated institutions do not have the incentives to make
the right decisions. And previously vertically integrated institutions can bar others
from using parts of their infrastructure. Divergent objectives of the many regulators
or even unhealthy competition between them decreases e±ciency even further.
The response by many regulators was therefore to withdraw a bit and let the
market mechanism work. The system in the securities industry in the European
Union in the 1990s therefore had some characteristics of the system of competitive
fragmentation: The rate of innovations like automated trading and the demutu-
alization of exchanges increased dramatically and many new entrants tried to do
business in the industry. The total amount of new investments was high and dupli-
cation of investments occurred in the process of battling for the dominant position
in a segment of the market. The users were fully aware of the costs imposed by the
incompatible communication standards between the national institutions and tried
to shape the industry to their liking.
Now that the investment boom is over and the rate of technological progress has
receded a bit, the securities industry in the European Union is again at a crossroads.
The rate of consolidation - horizontally as well as vertically - remains high and
many unsuccessful ventures were forced to close down and leave the industry. New
entrants that could keep up the pressure to innovate are not to be seen. The
surviving providers try to entrench their monopoly position by vertical integration
and proprietary communication standards.
It is an open question how and if their rent appropriation possibilities will be
countered either by tougher regulation that would put the European securities in-
dustry back to a system of regulated consolidation or whether the users of the
infrastructure can ensure together with a cut-down regulatory institution that the
system of contestable monopolies can be reached. It is very crucial that a consistent
con¯guration of key parameters of our framework is achieved to avoid a system with
a quasi-unregulated monopoly which might be preferred by infrastructure providers
but certainly not by the users and society at large.
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